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On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: 
The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over 
Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq 
Wm. C. Peters∗
I. OPENING 
[N]ot one private military contractor has been prosecuted or 
punished for a crime in Iraq (unlike the dozens of U.S. soldiers 
who have), despite the fact that more than 20,000 contractors have 
now spent almost two years there. Either every one of them 
happens to be a model citizen, or there are serious shortcomings in 
the legal system that governs them.1
Two weeks before the collapse of Baghdad during the Iraqi 
campaign of the U.S.-led global war against radical Islamists,2 the 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. 
I am grateful to Lieutenant Colonel John M. Bickers and Professor Margaret Stock of the West 
Point Department of Law for their helpful review and insightful comments on an earlier draft 
of this Article. Any errors in content, clarity, or organization of the finished product, of course, 
remain my own. The author serves with the rank of major in the Judge Advocate General’s 
Corps Regiment. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; 
B.A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; J.D. (cum laude), Northern Illinois 
University; LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law; LL.M. (military law), the Judge 
Advocate General’s School of the Army. The views presented in this Article are solely the 
author’s; they do not represent the position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army and 
its legal branch, or any particular commanding officer. 
 1. P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2005, at 127. Since 
Singer’s observation a year ago, a U.S. government contractor employed by DynCorp 
International was charged with defrauding the United States through unauthorized 
distribution of identity badges. The badges at issue would have granted those in possession 
access to Baghdad’s Green Zone, the area of the city that includes the U.S. Embassy and 
numerous offices of the Iraqi government. Jerry Markon & Josh White, Contractor Charged in 
Baghdad Badge Scam, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2005, at A19. Prosecutions of fraud and related 
offenses that touch corruption in the formulation and administration of defense contracts in 
Iraq have been more actively pursued by the Department of Justice. See James Glanz, Iraqi 
Translator Is Accused of Bribery in Kickback Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2006, at A6. These 
cases, however, may be distinguished from the nebulous regime of criminal justice applicable 
to civilian contractors that operate day to day alongside of active duty military forces in Iraq. 
 2. “And those nations that harbor and support them” completes a statement of the 
doctrine. See George W. Bush, U S. President, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
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Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade moved to seize oil fields in northern 
Iraq. The operation was a tactical effort to preserve resources crucial 
to a democratic Iraq’s recovery and to prevent Saddam Hussein from 
again unleashing ecologic terrorism on a mass scale.3 The 173rd 
Airborne’s move also served strategically to dissuade a Kurdish 
independence movement and to block their potential for expansion 
toward southern regions with a Shia majority—regions that the 
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 
20010920-8.html (“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”); 
see also BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 31 (2002). Discounting this early enunciation of the 
current administration’s war goals, some argue that waging war in Iraq has no relevant link to 
the terrorist attacks perpetrated by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001. This sanguine view flies 
in the face of specific U.S. congressional determinations that members of al Qaeda were openly 
operating within Iraq as of October 2002, and that Iraq continued, at that time, to “aid and 
harbor other international terrorist organizations . . . that threaten the lives and safety of 
United States citizens.” Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 
Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1499 (2002). In a 2002 address to West 
Point graduates, President Bush stated, “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his 
plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the 
only path to safety is the path of action.” George W. Bush, U.S. President, Address at West 
Point Graduation Ceremony (June 1, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/06/20020601-3.html;  NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 11 (2003), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/ 
counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf. See generally THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ 
nss.pdf. Refusal to acknowledge any Iraqi-al Qaeda confederacy based on the perceived 
divergent secular and radical worldviews of both ignores the findings of the bipartisan 9/11 
Commission. The Commission found that although no specific operational link between Iraq 
and al Qaeda was uncovered as to the 2001 attacks on the United States, a shared 
commonality of purpose led to repeated meetings between al Qaeda and representatives of 
Iraqi intelligence in both Afghanistan and Iraq throughout the 1990s. See NAT’L COMM’N ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 66 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 
REPORT]. As early as the mid-1990s, al Qaeda’s aspiring caliph, Usama bin Laden, personally 
met with a high-level Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum, Sudan, seeking weapons and 
training for his fighters. Id. at 61. He likely met with Iraqi officials as recently as 1999 when 
Hussein’s government offered bin Laden safety in the form of Iraqi residency. Id. at 66. A 
number of careful investigative authors have documented the strong possibility of an Iraqi link 
to the first New York World Trade Center bombing in February 1993. See STEPHEN F. HAYES, 
THE CONNECTION (2004); LAURIE MYLROIE, THE WAR AGAINST AMERICA: SADDAM 
HUSSEIN AND THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACKS (2001). One author reports that the 
then Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, wanted to pursue the possible Iraq 
connection to that attack but was dissuaded by National Security Council staffers in the 
Clinton Administration. GERALD POSNER, WHY AMERICA SLEPT 63 (2003). 
 3. During the closing days of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Saddam Hussein’s forces 
pursued “scorched earth” tactics by setting several hundred oil wells on fire and releasing some 
ten million barrels of crude oil into the Persian Gulf. RICK ATKINSON, CRUSADE: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 185, 352, 492 (1993). 
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Sunni Muslim minority previously dominated politically. Open civil 
war among Iraqi religious and ethnic factions was not the desired 
end state of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Following the early deployment of stabilizing U.S. military forces 
into Iraq, privatized contractors representing the Department of 
Defense, individual armed services, and various U.S. government 
agencies arrived. These contractors initially filled service support 
roles, such as logistics, and provided an enhanced transportation 
capability. Over time, however, they came to provide operational 
functions in limited circumstances. Many contract employees 
provided their own security elements and organized armed convoy 
operations over main supply routes through hostile territory; 
similarly, heavily armed contractors often accompanied active duty 
soldiers during combat operations, serving as translators and 
interrogators.4
The existing U.S. legal regime available to address instances of 
criminal misconduct by such contractors on the battlefield includes 
the option of both federal district court prosecution and military 
courts-martial. This Article argues the case that military courts-
martial of civilian contractors, particularly for those accused of war 
crimes and similarly serious offenses, is not only constitutional but 
also the preferred course of judicial action. 
Of the myriad of problems that arise with the increased use of 
civilian contractors performing military functions during combat 
operations, some of the more salient are highlighted by the following 
fictional account. It is late December 2003 and civilian contractors 
from a Wisconsin-based company called Red River Group-USA 
comprise all of the translators and more than half of the interrogators 
at an Army-administered prison northwest of Kirkuk known as the 
Dokan Pit.5 After a local man with suspected ties to Sunni insurgents 
 4. See generally Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 14, 2005, at 
28; Jonathan Finer, Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings, WASH. POST, 
Sep. 10, 2005, at A1; Nathan Hodge, Army Chief Notes ‘Problematic’ Potential of Armed 
Contractors on the Battlefield, DEF. DAILY, Aug. 26, 2005; David Washburn & Bruce V. 
Bigelow, In Harm’s Way: Titan in Iraq, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 24, 2005, at A1. 
Between April 2003 and October 2005, over three hundred non-Iraqi contract civilians 
accompanying the force have been killed in the fighting, along with hundreds more civilian 
Iraqi contractors. John Ward Anderson & Steve Fainaru, U.S. Confirms Killing of Contractors 
in Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A16. 
 5. This government contract company, named prison facility, its location, oversight, 
and staff structure are completely fictional, as is the scenario that immediately follows it above. 
2PETERS.FIN(2).DOC 6/16/2006 3:02:32 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
370 
 
was detained by a 173rd Brigade patrol for his role in concealing 
improvised explosive devices along Route Irish, the heavily traveled 
supply road between Baghdad’s International Airport and the Green 
Zone, he was promptly transferred to the Dokan Pit. A zealous 
contract interrogator from Red River Group assumed responsibility 
for the suspected insurgent. 
The detainee was identified as Ahmed Mire Wali. The Army 
patrol’s combat lifesaver informed the Red River Group contractor 
that the detainee had suffered numerous injuries, including the 
likelihood of broken ribs, when he violently resisted capture by U.S. 
forces. The medic relayed that Wali had not yet received sufficient 
medical treatment for those injuries. It was late in the day, a light 
rain was beginning to fall, and both daylight and the temperature 
were dropping. 
After stripping the man and removing his makeshift blindfold 
fashioned from a sandbag long enough to intimidate him with 
leashed but unmuzzled attack dogs, the Red River interrogator 
hosed him down with cold water and struck him forcefully numerous 
times in his ribs with a heavy metal flashlight. The interrogator then 
had the detainee chained naked to the floor of his outside holding 
cell. The interrogator directed junior enlisted soldiers from the Iowa 
National Guard military police unit on duty to leave him there until 
questioning would begin the next day. When morning arrived, Mire 
Wali was found dead, presumably the result of hypothermia.6
It is designed solely to highlight the legal issues of criminal jurisdiction inherent in instances of 
misconduct involving civilians serving with or accompanying U.S. armed forces in the field in 
time of war. The timeliness and relevancy of the topic is magnified by the recent publication of 
interrogation rules for the Department of Defense (DOD). The guidelines expressly apply to 
civilian contractor employees operating “under DoD cognizance.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
DIRECTIVE NO. 3115.09, DOD INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATIONS, DETAINEE DEBRIEFINGS, 
AND TACTICAL QUESTIONING (Nov. 3, 2005). 
 6. For a parallel incident, see the single ongoing federal criminal prosecution brought 
under the extraterritorial jurisdiction of 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (2000) involving a Central 
Intelligence Agency contractor in Afghanistan. United States v. Passaro, No. 5:04-CR-211-1 
(E.D.N.C. filed June 17, 2004). The case began on the merits in October 2005. See Passaro 
Trial Pushed to October, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, June 25, 2005, available at 
http://www.newsobserver.com/497/story/297925.html. Interestingly, Passaro’s defense 
counsel has argued that only an Afghani or U.S. military court has jurisdiction to try him. See 
Andrea Weigl, Passaro Dismissal Try Rejected, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 13, 2005, 
available at http://www.newsobserver.com/497/story/260625.html; see also Douglas Jehl & 
David Johnston, Within C.I.A., Growing Fears of Prosecution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at 
A1; Dana Priest, CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2005, at 
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Although this imagined scenario serves only as backdrop for the 
legal issues this Article explores, the possibility of similar incidents is 
apparent from recent perusal of our nation’s newspapers. What 
criminal charges, if any, could be brought under the circumstances of 
this hypothetical setting?7 Against whom could the United States 
Army proceed criminally, and in what forum? Should the Army’s 
junior enlisted soldiers be court-martialed for violation of their 
special orders or dereliction of duty,8 cruelty and maltreatment,9 
unlawful detention,10 involuntary manslaughter,11 or even conspiracy 
to commit murder?12 Under what federal statutes or treaty-based law 
of war might the civilian contractor be charged, and what 
jurisdictional scheme would govern? Are there any constitutional 
limitations that require the civilian contractor to be tried in federal 
district court? 
This Article presents the case for courts-martial jurisdiction over 
a very narrow class of government contractors that includes our Red 
River Group interrogator. It examines the legal regimes applicable to 
civilian contractors who commit criminal misconduct while serving 
with U.S. uniformed military personnel in the field during times of 
war. The evidence will show that existing statutes provide that 
federal district courts13 and military courts14 have concurrent 
A1; R. Jeffrey Smith, Interrogator Says U.S. Approved Handling of Detainee Who Died, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at A7. 
 7. Whether to prosecute a given case once the professional ethical obligation is satisfied 
is always a matter of discretion based on both evidentiary and policy concerns. This article 
primarily addresses the “how” of prosecutions in a wartime setting with the admitted 
assumption that there will be at least some incidents worthy of court action arising from a 
major military deployment where contractors take part in large number. Despite this Article’s 
opening observation, I refrain from in-depth analysis of why it might be good policy to bring a 
criminal action in the first instance. 
 8. See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2004). 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 comprise the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), the federal criminal statute applicable to all U.S. service members on 
active duty, regardless of their geographic location. 
 9. See id. § 893. 
 10. See id. § 897. 
 11. See id. § 919(b). 
 12. See id. § 881. 
 13. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction provisions grant in personam jurisdiction 
to prosecute certain substantive criminal offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (2000); see also Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000); War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 
(2000). All three federal provisions adopt the nationality theory of a nation state’s jurisdiction 
to proscribe conduct of its citizens abroad. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 534 (2003). This Article does not explore the potential for causes 
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jurisdiction over civilian misconduct occurring in theaters of combat 
operations. 
Historical practice, existing legislation, and the pragmatic 
realities of our contractor-heavy Iraqi campaign all weigh in favor of 
using courts-martial jurisdiction over civilian contractors. Existing 
military case law, primarily the Court of Military Appeals ruling in 
United States v. Averette,15 precludes military jurisdiction over 
civilians except when war has been expressly declared by Congress. 
That view, however, is based on outdated and misunderstood 
Supreme Court precedent as it relates to roles performed by contract 
civilians today, is inconsistent with other statutory interpretations of 
“times of war,” and disregards that concerted executive and 
legislative action is required for engaging in any military campaign, 
regardless of a formal declaration. Recognizing military court 
jurisdiction over civilian contractors accompanying combat troops 
was contemplated by the drafters of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice,16 is squarely within the competency of Congress, and does 
not run afoul of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. 
Two principal options currently exist to rectify the paucity of 
criminal enforcement actions taken against contractors who operate 
alongside our active duty forces in the war against Islamist terrorism. 
First, the Department of Justice could pursue a vigorous agenda to 
investigate and charge actionable misconduct by civilian contractors 
engaged in the Iraqi campaign. Second, if military appellate courts or 
the Supreme Court were to overrule Averette or if Congress were to 
bypass its holding through amendments to existing statutes, military 
commanders could charge civilian contractors and bring them before 
courts-martial convened on site in the theater of combat operations. 
of action arising in civil liability under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). See 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See generally Scott J. Borrowman, Comment, 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu Ghraib—Civil Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts 
by U.S. Military Personnel and Civilian Contractors, 2005 BYU L. REV. 371. 
 14. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)(10), 818; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 
UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 201(f)(1)(B) (2002 ed.) [hereinafter MANUAL], available at 
http://www.dsca.mil/diils/library/US%20Manual%20for%20Courts-Martial%202002.pdf. For 
an analysis of U.S. courts-martial possibilities for foreigners accused of serious human rights 
violations during internal armed conflict under 10 U.S.C. § 818, see Jan E. Aldykiewicz & 
Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority To Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military Personnel for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed During Internal Armed Conflicts, 
167 MIL. L. REV. 74 (2001). 
 15. 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970). 
 16. See infra text accompanying note 43. 
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Despite statutes empowering federal extraterritorial prosecutions 
and a recent amendment to one of those statutes that makes it 
expressly applicable to government agency contractors and 
subcontractors, only one such case has commenced to date, and it 
derives from conduct in Afghanistan in 2002.17
The first option, federal district court prosecution, has proven 
ineffective. The government has not charged any misconduct arising 
from civilian contractor actions taken against detainees of the 
insurgency in the Iraqi theater despite numerous prosecutions of 
active duty military service members. Some twenty cases of suspected 
criminal misconduct by civilian contractors in Iraq were referred to 
the Department of Justice for prosecution, yet only the one 
indictment referred to above has actually been filed.18 Whether this 
anomaly is reflective of more pressing domestic concerns at the 
Department of Justice, the practical expense and difficulty of trying 
cases arising in very distant locations, or simple evidentiary 
shortcomings and problems of proof, is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Recognizing military court jurisdiction over the conduct of 
civilian contractors in the field could, however, bring to an end this 
current dearth of federal prosecutions. 
This Article makes the case that military commanders can and 
should charge civilian contractors at courts-martial convened where 
the crimes are committed under appropriate circumstances. The 
ability for a commander to regulate the behavior of available forces—
active duty or contractor—is critical to maintaining discipline and 
fostering a unified fighting morale. Admittedly, this step would be 
highly unusual and would break from recent military practice.19 
However, the statutory basis, constitutional framework, policy 
rationale, and practical necessity for just such actions are both 
available and compelling. 
In order for our military to employ the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), which already allows for courts-martial 
 17. United States v. Passaro, No. 5:04-CR-211-1 (E.D.N.C. filed June 17, 2004). 
 18. See id.; see also Jonathan Finer, State Department Contractors Kill 2 Civilians in N. 
Iraq, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2006, at A18; Christian Miller, Private Security Guards in Iraq 
Operate with Little Supervision, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at A1; Josh White, Indictment Has 
Followed in 1 of 20 Abuse Cases, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2006, at A20. 
 19. Pursuant to the Staff Judge Advocate’s pretrial advice to a commander prior to 
convening a general courts-martial, the command’s top legal officer must indicate in writing 
his or her legal conclusion, inter alia, that a courts-martial would have jurisdiction over the 
accused and offenses to be tried. See 10 U.S.C. § 834(a)(3). 
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jurisdiction over certain civilians, prosecutors would have to 
overcome current military case law. This could be accomplished in 
one of two ways. First, the arraigning military service prosecuting 
such a case, most likely the Army or Marine Corps, could bring an 
interlocutory appeal asking the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces20 or, if necessary, the Supreme Court to overrule the narrow 
holding of United States v. Averette.21 This 1970 Court of Military 
Appeals’ decision is the seminal ruling on the UCMJ’s jurisdictional 
definition of “time of war.”22 Averette’s holding limits courts-martial 
jurisdiction over certain civilians to those serving with the force in 
times of war expressly declared by Congress. 
Second, Congress could amend § 802(a)(10) of the UCMJ to 
provide for courts-martial jurisdiction in instances of misconduct by 
civilians accompanying or serving with the armed forces in times of 
armed conflict. The clarification of “armed conflict” in place of 
“war,” or more specifically, formally declared war, would moot the 
holding in Averette and allow military commanders the power of the 
courts-martial process to enforce discipline uniformly among all 
military assets within their respective areas of responsibility.23
 20. Military courts-martial results may be appealed first to individual service courts of 
appeal made up of senior uniformed military judges (Army Court of Criminal Appeals, Navy 
and Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, and so forth). Appeals are then made to the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, composed of civilian judges appointed by the 
President, which may review appeals from all the armed services. Finally, appeals are made to 
the United States Supreme Court. Because the holding in United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 
363 (1970), is binding authority on a military trial court, the defense would undoubtedly 
move to dismiss any charge against a civilian for lack of jurisdiction. Assuming the trial court 
granted such a motion, the Government would have seventy-two hours to appeal the 
constitutional issue. See 10 U.S.C. § 862(a); see also MANUAL, supra note 14, R.C.M. 908. 
 21. 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970). 
 22. Id. The U.S. Court of Military Appeals was subsequently designated the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces in 1995. 
 23. Similar language was proposed as an amendment to the UCMJ through the Fiscal 
Year 1996 Department of Defense (DOD) Authorization Act. The Department of Justice 
(DOJ) determined that it was likely an amendment to Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ, 
extending courts-martial jurisdiction over civilians during contingency operations in armed 
conflict, presented possible constitutional problems and therefore did not support that portion 
of the proposed amendment. Telephone Interview with John De Pue, former Senior Trial 
Attorney, Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 7, 2005). Mr. 
De Pue was the DOJ representative on the panel that considered the amendment. A joint DOJ 
and DOD Advisory Committee was established with direction to review and make 
recommendations to Congress before January 15, 1997 “concerning the appropriate forum for 
criminal jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces in the field outside the 
United States in time of armed conflict.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
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Part II of this Article lays out our case’s evidentiary foundation 
through the United States’ historical practice regarding civilian 
misconduct in combat settings and the recent rise of the extensive 
use of civilian contractors to wage war. In Part III, I articulate my 
case in chief: the statutory means under which prosecutions of 
civilian contractors could currently be employed, the judicial 
decisions that have limited civilian prosecutions in military courts for 
the last fifty years, and the reason those decisions were wrongly 
decided or are no longer controlling as to civilian contractors 
accompanying our forces at war today. 
In rebuttal to expected criticism of my theory of the case, and in 
response to anticipated arguments that courts-martial jurisdiction 
should not be recognized over our Red River contract interrogator, 
Part IV argues that creating military court jurisdiction over certain 
civilians is within Congress’s plenary power. Part IV also deals with 
likely constitutional objections to recognizing the latent military 
court jurisdiction over this very narrow class of civilians. It also 
articulates some pragmatic benefits of using military courts. Finally, 
in Part V, this Article’s closing concludes that it is simply 
unacceptable to allow our national system of criminal justice to 
rightfully punish American soldiers for the very types of crimes for 
which, to date, alleged civilian perpetrators remain untouched.24
1996, Pub. L. 104-106, §1151, 110 Stat. 186. Regardless of any recommendations generated 
in that report, it appears that Congress has been satisfied with the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act and the War Crimes Act, measures that address jurisdiction to try civilians for 
misconduct occurring overseas but that generall defray a direct courts-martial option. See supra 
note 13. 
 24. For example, despite investigations that led to the courts-martial of numerous Army 
junior enlisted and noncommissioned officers for their crimes at the Abu Ghraib prison 
complex in Iraq, six civilian contractors implicated as culpable of wrongdoing in the very same 
investigations remain unindicted in the federal courts as of this writing. For findings of U.S. 
Army investigations, the Taguba report, and the Jones/Fay report, see MARK DANNER, 
TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 302, 424, 426, 
447, 509, 518, 520, 522–23, 552 (2004); Singer, supra note 1, at 128; see also Rowan 
Scarborough, Abu Ghraib Convict Breaks Silence, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A5 (soldier 
convicted at courts-martial implicates civilian contractor in detainee’s abuse). For an overview 
of the military investigations that have resulted in more than 230 soldiers being punished for 
detainee abuse, including the Abu Ghraib and other Iraqi-related prosecutions, see A Roll Call 
of Recent Abuse Cases, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2005, at A9; Beating of Iraqi General Alleged in 
Army Hearing, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2005, at A21; Melissa Edy, U.S. Soldier Convicted in 
Iraqi Shooting Death: Charge Is Reduced to Manslaughter, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2005, at A21; 
Erwin Emery, Army Captain Found Guilty of Assaulting Iraqi Detainees, DENVER POST, Mar. 
17, 2005, at A1; Scott Gold, 5 Calif. Guardsmen Face Charges of Abusing Iraqis, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 2005, at A1; Scott Gold & Rone Tempest, Army Probes Guard Unit, L.A. TIMES, 
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A. Sutlers25 in the Ranks 
Civilians have accompanied American military forces in the ranks, 
in the field, and at post, camp, and station since the War of 
Independence. Not only did family members and servants—
identified as “retainers”26 under the Articles of War during the 
revolutionary period—travel with the fledgling American forces, 
specific provisions of law allowed for their discipline by means of 
military courts-martial.27 This legal tradition creates the basis for 
current statutes that allow military court jurisdiction over certain 
civilians accompanying soldiers in the field during time of war. 
Colonel William Winthrop, remembered as the Blackstone of 
United States military law, observed that under the 63rd Article of 
War in force during the Revolutionary War, “[a]ll retainers to the 
camp, and all persons serving with the armies of the United States in 
the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to be subject to orders, 
according to the rules and discipline of war.”28 Winthrop continued, 
July 27, 2005, at A1; Guard Members Tried for Detainee Abuse, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at 
5; Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Military Says 26 Inmate Deaths May Be Homicide, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at A1; Miles Moffiet & Arthur Kane, Army Charges 4 in Death, 
DENVER POST, Oct. 5, 2004, at A1; Nicholas Riccardi, Interrogator Convicted in Iraqi’s Death, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, at A1; Nicholas Riccardi, Mild Penalties in Military Abuse Cases, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at A8; Tom Roeder, Fort Carson Murder Cases Delayed until 2006, 
COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 18, 2005, at Metro 3; Richard A. Serrano & Mark Mazzetti, 
Charges Sought Against Officer at Abu Ghraib, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A11; Jackie 
Spinner, MP Gets 8 Years for Iraq Abuse, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2004, at A20; U.S. Soldier 
Avoids Jail in Killing, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2005, at A15; Josh White, 5 Soldiers Charged with 
Abuse of Detainees, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2005, at A12; Josh White, Detainees Abused in N. 
Iraq, Army Papers Suggest, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2005, at A11; Josh White, Documents Tell of 
Brutal Improvisation by GIs, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at A1. But see Army Not To Try 17 
Soldiers, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at A2; Military Review Exonerates Officials in Abuses, 
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A14. 
 25. A sutler is “[a] provisioner to an army post esp. when established in a shop on the 
post.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2304 (2002). By definition, 
sutlers were civilians, serving with but not in the ranks of the uniformed military. They were 
just one class of numerous civilian members accompanying early American military forces that 
historically were subject to courts-martial jurisdiction. 
 26. The term “retainers” included officers’ servants and other categories of camp 
followers that tended to the army’s needs but otherwise maintained a civilian’s status in their 
individual capacity. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 98 (1920). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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This provision, which, with some slight modifications, has come 
down from our original code of 1775, which derived it from a 
corresponding British article, has always been interpreted as 
subjecting the descriptions of persons specified, not only to the 
orders made for the government and discipline of the command to 
which they may be attached, but also to trial by court-martial for 
violations of the military code. Protected as they are by the military 
arm, they owe to it the correlative obligation of obedience; and a 
due consideration for the morale and discipline of the troops . . . .29
In legislation passed during the Ninth Congress’s first session in 
1806, Article 63 was renumbered Article 60 and updated by 
expanding on the language quoted above. Article 60 amended 
criminal jurisdiction of civilians over sutlers and retainers, adding an 
additional category for “all persons whatsoever, serving with the 
armies of the United States.”30
Throughout major military expeditions and armed campaigns in 
U.S. history, civilians accompanying the force have played critical 
roles. Nearly a quarter of Captain Lewis and Lieutenant Clark’s 
complement of adventurers were civilian contractors.31 During the 
Civil War, civilian family members, correspondents, couriers, 
teamsters, and quartermasters often swelled the ranks of camps and 
units on the march. In his memoirs, President Grant recalled that 
“thousands of employees in the quartermaster’s and other 
departments,”32 in addition to garrisoned, uniformed soldiers, were 
used to strengthen the defense of Nashville and thus allowed Union 
General Tecumseh Sherman’s march through Georgia to the sea.33
The civilian presence with military units continued during the 
Indian wars on the western plains and in the Dakota Territory. In 
June 1876, Army cavalry and infantry units assembled to assault the 
 29. Id. 
 30. MILITARY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE ARMY, MARINE CORPS, 
VOLUNTEERS, MILITIA, AND TO BOUNTY LANDS AND PENSIONS 146–47 (John F. Callan ed., 
Balt., John Murphy & Co., 1858). 
 31. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
367 (1965). The majority of civilians employed “were engages—that is, professional rivermen.” 
THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK, at xv (John Bakeless ed., 1964); see also STEPHEN E. 
AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE 128 (1996) (discussing Captain Lewis’s instructions for 
the expedition’s contractor requirements). 
 32. ULYSSES S. GRANT, PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U.S. GRANT 489 (E.B. Long ed., 
1982) (1885–86). 
 33. Id. 
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Lakota Sioux seasonal encampments. The United States’ forces were 
accompanied by civilian packers with General Crook’s column34 and 
a contract surgeon who would die with Custer at the Battle of the 
Little Bighorn.35 Shortly before the 7th Cavalry’s historic fight, 
Custer allegedly threatened to hang a civilian scout for perceived 
incompetence in reporting the daunting size of the Indian force.36
The use of civilian contractors by the military did not end with 
settlement of the American West. During the Great War in Europe, 
persons subject to military courts included those civilians 
accompanying or serving with the forces outside the United States 
and, given it was a time of war, extended even to those serving with 
the forces of the United States in the field “within . . . the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.”37 Under the 1917 Manual for 
Courts-Martial, contractors serving in such diverse positions as mates 
on steamships, cooks and watchmen on Army transports crossing the 
Atlantic, and auditors of quartermaster units at stateside training 
posts were all subject to military-court jurisdiction.38
Throughout World War II, civilian contractors performed 
certain, limited noncombat duties alongside active duty service 
members on land and at sea, in combat theaters, and at home 
stations. Civilian scientists donned military uniforms when 
conducting operational studies in hostile theaters,39 while contract 
civilian engineers and construction personnel were taken prisoners of 
 34. See LOUISE BARNETT, TOUCHED BY FIRE: THE LIFE, DEATH, AND MYTHIC 
AFTERLIFE OF GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER 280 (1996). 
 35. Id. at 276, 283. 
 36. Id. at 287–88. Civilian guides rode with the Army’s storied 7th Cavalry as late as 
their last major horseback operation, the March 1916 strike into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho 
Villa. See HERBERT MOLLOY MASON, JR., THE GREAT PURSUIT 97 (1970). 
 37. A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL COURTS OF INQUIRY AND OF OTHER 
PROCEDURES UNDER MILITARY LAW 4 (1917). Paragraph 4(e) reads, 
PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW . . . [t]he following persons are subject 
to the Articles of War . . . (e) [a]ll retainers to the camp and all persons 
accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war all such retainers and persons 
accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States in the field, both 
within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States though not 
otherwise subject to the Articles of War. 
Id. 
 38. Id.; see also infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 39. Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the 
Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 118 (2001). 
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war during Japan’s sweep through the South Pacific.40 When 
contractors serving with the military during both world wars 
committed crimes, even counsel for those who might oppose the 
practice of court-martialing civilian contractors today should 
stipulate that federal courts squarely upheld courts-martial 
jurisdiction.41
One of today’s federal statutes that defines military court 
jurisdiction—10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) of the UCMJ—originated in 
earlier versions of the Articles of War. Section 802(a)(10) provides 
that “(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter: . . . (10) 
In time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed 
force in the field.”42 This language is clearly applicable to contractors 
accompanying our uniformed military, fulfilling military functions, 
and being employed on military missions in the Iraqi campaign. 
Certainly, our Red River Group defendant meets all five elements of 
the statute: in a time of war he is serving with and accompanying an 
armed force in the field. 
During House subcommittee hearings on § 802(a)(10), the 
Assistant General Counsel of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
made very clear that during wartime and while in the field, this 
provision would allow courts-martial jurisdiction over civilian 
members of the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, members of church 
organizations, reporters, civilian employees of the services, and 
indeed, anyone within a commander’s sphere of operation.43 
 40. Id. at 118–19. 
 41. See Hines v. Mikell, 259 F. 28 (4th Cir. 1919); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 
80 (E.D. Va. 1943); In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Ex parte Jochen, 257 
F. 200 (S.D. Tex. 1919); Ex parte Falls 251 F. 415 (D.N.J. 1918); Ex parte Gerlach, 247 F. 
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). But see Hammond v. Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wash. 1943) 
(holding an improperly convened military commission without jurisdiction to try a civilian 
seaman for disobeying a naval officer while attached to a merchant ship at sea); Ex parte Weitz, 
256 F. 58 (D. Mass. 1919) (holding that driver of automobile employed by construction 
contractor at Camp Devens that struck and killed a soldier was beyond the jurisdiction of 
military courts). Perhaps owing to the suddenness of the ground attack in the Korean War and 
the close proximity of ground combat, less has been recorded about civilians accompanying 
forces there between 1950 and 1953. However, merchant-mariners delivered U.S. fighting 
forces to the Korean Peninsula and early logistical response efforts required the United States 
to contract with Japanese transport ships and crews. See CLAY BLAIR, THE FORGOTTEN WAR 
96 (1987). 
 42. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2000). 
 43. Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on 
Armed Servs. on H.R. 2498, 81st Cong. 872–73 (1949) (statement of Felix Larkin, Assistant 
General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense). 
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Congress passed § 802(a)(10) into law with no objections from 
members of the House subcommittee that examined the statute line 
by line.44 Surely if the drafters considered Red Cross members and 
news reporters accompanying a force in wartime to be subject to 
courts-martial, paid contractors performing military missions and 
engaging enemy combatants would be. 
As we will see in greater detail in Part IV, the necessity for an 
existing state of war and contractors’ active participation in that 
endeavor comprise the keystones that allow military courts to try 
misconduct committed by certain, narrow classes of civilian. 
B. The Rise of Privatized Military Firms45
Civilian contractor support to U.S. armed forces during combat 
operations, though a historical reality down through the years, has 
increased dramatically since the Vietnam War era. At the high-water 
mark of U.S. efforts in Vietnam, 550,000 U.S. service members were 
serving in the war. At the same time, roughly 9000 civilian 
employees served in support roles through contracts awarded from 
the Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam.46
Following the Vietnam War, a continual reduction in the 
number of U.S. military personnel throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
meant that more civilian contractors would undertake roles formerly 
occupied by the military. By the mid-1980s, “with a shrinking 
budget and limited logistical capability, Army planners concluded 
that contractors were necessary to fill the gaps in the Army’s 
logistical support plan. The LOGCAP program was born.”47 The 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) was created to 
facilitate the use of civilian contractors for short-fuse deployment 
operations. The basic concept was to ensure ongoing readiness for 
 44. Id. at 873. 
 45. The term “privatized military firm” (PMF) and its academic study is perhaps most 
notably attributed to P.W. Singer, currently the director of the Project on U.S. Policy Towards 
the Islamic World at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. See 
generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY (2003). 
 46. Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with 
Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 235 (2000). 
 47. Id. at 237. 
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the delivery of logistical services “on short notice anywhere in the 
world in any type of contingency operation or military conflict.”48
Today’s “private military industry emerged at the start of the 
1990s,”49 writes the Brookings Institution’s P.W. Singer, and was 
“driven by three dynamics: the end of the Cold War, transformations 
in the nature of warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers and 
civilians, and a general trend toward privatization and outsourcing of 
government functions around the world.”50
The present surge in the use of defense contractors is one result 
of the Clinton Administration’s accelerated military downsizing 
policies that began during the first Bush administration. Following 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense undertook a 
drastic downsizing of personnel and a reduction in defense 
spending—this despite the fact that the 1991 Persian Gulf War saw 
the largest deployment of military forces since Vietnam in support of 
a conflict unrelated to the former Soviet Empire. This so-called 
“peace dividend” would ultimately result in a thirty percent 
reduction of the U.S. active duty force during the 1990s.51
During this reduction of active duty strength, military 
deployments in support of peace-keeping and humanitarian 
interventions, dramatically increased the services’ operational tempo. 
Forces were deployed to Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and even 
Florida.52 Notwithstanding these often overlapping operations, the 
 48. Id. Shortly after the award of the first LOGCAP procurement, Houston, Texas-
based Brown and Root Services Corporation arrived in the failed East African state of Somalia 
in late 1992 to support Operation Restore Hope. Brown and Root provided construction, 
food service, laundry, and countless other logistic requirements through the spring of 1995. 
For much of that period, Brown and Root was the largest single employer in the country, 
employing some 2500 Somalis. SINGER, supra note 45, at 143. From the author’s personal 
experience during two assignments to Somalia in both early 1993 and through March of 1994, 
Brown and Root personnel participated in nearly every aspect of military staff planning, if not 
actual execution. Because of their pervasive presence throughout areas where regional support 
efforts and combat operations were underway, Brown and Root regularly provided a 
representative at the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, Quick Reaction Force (QRF) brigade 
staff calls. 
 49. Singer, supra note 1, at 120. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Max Boot, Korean Crisis Reveals U.S. War Flaws, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2003, at 
A13, cited in Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 369, 374 (2004). 
 52. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew’s devastation of much of Florida in 1992, the 
government deployed thousands of active duty military personnel to support relief efforts and 
work beside overwhelmed National Guard and FEMA personnel. 
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Clinton Administration embarked on its “reinventing government” 
campaign. In conjunction with the passage of the 1998 Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform Act,53 which outsourced positions 
deemed other than inherently governmental when economically 
efficient to do so, the administration continued military cutbacks. 
The Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, announced the policy of 
military streamlining in 1997: “We can sustain the shooters and 
reduce the supporters—we can keep the tooth, but cut the tail.”54 
Cohen’s announcement “prefaced modern military’s unprecedented 
reliance on civilian contractors.”55
The startling growth in the ratio of contractors compared to 
active duty service members during overseas deployments 
demonstrates the policy in practice. During the Gulf War in 1991, 
slightly more than five thousand contractors helped support half a 
million troops.56 In the Balkans, from 1995 to 2000, contractors 
actually outnumbered active duty forces by three thousand civilian 
personnel.57 With approximately 138,000 service members currently 
serving in the Iraqi Campaign58 (a number that has remained fairly 
static over the last three years), an American Bar Association report 
estimates that there are about thirty thousand U.S. contractors 
operating in Iraq, or “about 10 times the ratio during the 1991 
Persian Gulf conflict.”59 When foreign workers actively engaged in 
the reconstruction and oil work are added to the government 
 53. Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382 (codified as amended at note following 31 
U.S.C. § 501 (2000)). 
 54. William S. Cohen, Sec’y of Def., Remarks to The Brookings Institution Board of 
Trustees (May 12, 1997), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1997/b051297_bt235-
97.html; Vernon, supra note 51, at 371. 
 55. Vernon, supra note 51, at 371. This thinking has persisted to compose at least one 
aspect of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s press for “transformation.” Frederick W. Kagan 
sharply critiques this business efficiency model and approach to military force structure. He 
argues that the absence of sufficient uniformed military forces in reserve presupposes that 
future U.S. conflicts will be waged without significant tactical error, that “excess” personnel 
will not be required to respond to an enemy’s unexpected counter actions, and that reserves 
will not be needed to capitalize on battlefield successes. Frederick W. Kagan, The War Against 
Reserves, NAT’L SECURITY OUTLOOK, Aug. 2005, at 1–5. 
 56. Vernon, supra note 51, at 374. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Rowan Scarborough, Troop Levels Likely to Increase, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, 
at A1. 
 59. Chris Lombardi, Law Curbs Contractors in Iraq, 3 A.B.A. J. E-REP., May 14, 2004, 
at 1. 
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contractor mix, the numbers swell as high as 50,000 to 75,000.60 If 
we recall from evidence introduced earlier that fewer than ten 
thousand civilians supported over half a million troops in Vietnam,61 
the phenomenon’s picture is complete. 
Today, privatized military firms (PMFs) provide an unparalleled 
breadth of support to the U.S. active duty military force. From 
providing instructors and manning the day-to-day operations of the 
Army’s Reserve Officer Training Corps’ programs;62 to writing Army 
Field Manuals;63 to teaching career senior Army officers graduate-
level courses in the military decision-making process and the details 
of staff planning;64 to providing mail delivery, food service, power 
generation, water distribution, refueling, and vehicle maintenance 
and repair in combat zones; PMFs have become indispensable to the 
United States’ ability to wage war.65
This development is not unique to the United States. On the 
global level, privatization of the soldier’s calling for profit has 
resulted in some PMFs taking on actual war-fighting roles. Firms 
such as “Executive Outcomes, Sandline, SCI, and NFD are the 
classic examples of this type of privatized military implementers, 
having run active combat operations in Angola, Sierra Leone, Papua 
New Guinea, Indonesia, and elsewhere.”66  
In 1995, at least one U.S. firm, ostensibly implementing 
administration objectives in the Balkans that U.S. active duty and 
United Nations sponsored forces would not pursue, stepped into a 
training role that proved so effective that some later questioned its 
propriety. 
 With the war also going badly for the Serb’s opponents and the 
UN peacekeeping operation languishing, the basic goal of U.S. 
policy in the region became to bring the situation to an endgame. 
 60. Max Boot, Commentary, The Iraq War’s Outsourcing Snafu, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
2005, at B13. 
 61. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
 62. SINGER, supra note 45, at 123. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 124. 
 65. Id. at 144. The continuing drain of highly qualified and experienced active duty 
members to the private military sector continues to concern military personnel managers. See 
James W. Crawley, Commandos Leaving In Record Numbers, WINSTON-SALEM J., July 30, 
2005, at A1; Richard Lardner, Senior Soldiers in Special Ops Being Lured Off, TAMPA TRIB., 
Mar. 21, 2005, at 1. 
 66. SINGER, supra note 45, at 93; see also supra note 4. 
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The concept was to turn the Croats into U.S.’s “junkyard dog”; 
that is, to strengthen them into a regional enforcer and ally them 
with the Bosnians, in order to balance Serbian power . . . . 
 It was at this time that the Pentagon referred the Croatian 
Defense Minister to MPRI.67
The resulting Croat offensive was not only surprisingly effective 
operationally, but it “violated the UN cease-fire and created 170,000 
new refugees. In addition, numerous reports of human rights 
violations surfaced in the wake of the offensive, including the 
murders of elderly Serbs who had stayed behind.”68 Although MPRI 
has denied any improper role that may have contributed to suspected 
war crimes violations, the International War Crimes Tribunal at the 
Hague reportedly contacted the U.S. Defense Department seeking 
information on the firm.69
Writing in the Spring 2005 edition of Foreign Affairs, P.W. 
Singer divided PMFs into three general categories: (1) military 
provider firms, sometimes called private security firms, which provide 
tactical operational support; (2) military consulting firms, most 
frequently manned by experienced former service members, which 
offer military advice and training; and (3) military support firms that 
generally fill logistics, maintenance, and intelligence functions.70 The 
best evidence thus allows that our case’s fictional Red River Group-
USA interrogator71 could be employed by any of these three strands 
of corporate military organizations currently serving in Iraq. 
 67. SINGER, supra note 45, at 125 (citation omitted). MPRI refers to Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Alexandria, 
Virginia. It is the same privatized military firm the U.S. Army contracted with to provide staff 
support for courses in military instruction at R.O.T.C. programs at U.S. colleges and 
universities from 1996 until the Army awarded the contract to COMTek, a different PMF, 
beginning in fiscal year 2002. The author served as legal counsel to U.S. Army Cadet 
Command (ROTC) from 2000 to 2002. Government contracts, once awarded, are matters of 
public record. 
 68. Id. at 126. 
 69. Id. at 122–23. 
 70. Singer, supra note 1, at 120–21. 
 71. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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III. THE CASE IN CHIEF 
Three separate statutes—the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction provision,72 the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(MEJA) and its subsequent amendments,73 and the War Crimes 
Act74 (WCA)—currently allow for prosecution in federal district 
court of U.S. civilian contractors for criminal acts committed in a 
wartime environment beyond the borders of the United States. 
Prosecutors can use 18 U.S.C. § 7 to bring misconduct within the 
purview of the federal courts by way of special maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction when other substantive provisions of federal 
law have been violated at any of the statute’s enumerated locations.75
The MEJA and the WCA also allow for federal court jurisdiction 
over misconduct committed by civilian contractors overseas. As 
noted, however, the tens of thousands of contractors who have 
served or are currently serving in the Iraqi campaign have either 
scrupulously avoided any meaningful misconduct, or government 
efforts to address those crimes are either lacking or simply ineffective 
in practice. The facts at least suggest the latter of these two 
possibilities.76
A. Constitutional Grounds for Criminal Jurisdiction over Contractors 
Accompanying the Force in Time of War 
When examining a statutory based legal regime, it is usually best 
to start at the beginning. In legislating the conduct of military land 
forces, providing for courts-martial, and punishing war crimes, the 
Constitution explicitly vests authority in Congress77 “[t]o make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces,”78 “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme 
Court,”79 and finally, “[t]o . . . make Rules concerning Captures on 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); see supra note 13. 
 73. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 74. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 75. See supra note 13. 
 76. See supra notes 18, 24. 
 77. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. 
 78. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 79. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. It is from this constitutional authority that military court 
jurisdiction derives. See MANUAL, supra note 14,  A21-3. 
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Land and Water,”80 and to “define and punish . . . Offences against 
the Law of Nations.”81 Of course, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
allows for any needed legislation otherwise grounded in Congress’s 
enumerated powers.82 Strands of all of these broad parameters of 
constitutional authority can be seen throughout the federal district 
court jurisdiction provisions that follow. 
When considering the concurrent jurisdiction of military courts 
and the leading cases discussed in Part C of this section, the reader 
may wish to keep in mind the Supreme Court opinions in 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure).83 Justice 
Frankfurter expressed the “historical gloss” interpretation of 
constitutional powers in that case.84 Broadly speaking, he suggested 
that congressional and executive powers are best considered in the 
light of our Republic’s practice over time. In addition, Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence articulated that the Constitution supports 
presidential power most clearly when the executive acts in concert 
with Congress.85 Particularly during wartime, the commander-in-
chief’s authority to make rules concerning the conduct of courts-
martial and to convene courts pursuant to the UCMJ should not be 
lightly disregarded.86
B. Statutory Provisions 
Part II introduced the historical practice of courts-martial 
jurisdiction covering civilians accompanying a force in wartime. I 
now move that the following statutes be examined more thoroughly 
to better understand the law federal prosecutors could employ to 
address civilian contractor misconduct in Iraq. The statutes are the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction provision, the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, and the War Crimes Act of 1997. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 81. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 82. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 83. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 84. Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 86. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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1. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction 
Certain provisions of the federal criminal code allow for in 
personam jurisdiction in the district courts for offenses occurring 
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States. Eight subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 7 define this jurisdictional 
scheme of U.S. practice. These provisions extend jurisdiction to areas 
of the “high seas, [and] any other waters within the admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction of the United States,”87 “[a]ny vessel 
registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws of the United 
States,”88 and “aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United 
States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or 
under the laws of the United States.”89
Two broader subsections apply to military locations and settings, 
one of them principally foreign and the other domestic. 18 U.S.C. § 
7(3) allows for federal court jurisdiction of offenses occurring on 
“[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, 
and under exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof” and also as to 
“any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by 
consent of the legislature of [a] State . . . for the erection of a fort, 
magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.”90 As a 
potential catch-all, subsection seven of the statute additionally 
confers U.S. jurisdiction to all places beyond any state’s jurisdiction 
when an offense is committed either by or against a U.S. national.91 
These provisions offer some jurisdictional authority over contractor 
misconduct overseas but do not readily create the judicial ability to 
prosecute contractor misconduct in a foreign occupied state during 
combat operations. 
2. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
For decades, military commanders and their subordinate legal 
staff officers suffered from a systemic shortcoming in enforcing 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) (2000). 
 88. Id. § 7(2). 
 89. Id. § 7(5). 
 90. Id. § 7(3). 
 91. Id. § 7(7). It is this provision at § 7(9)(A) that is being used to convey jurisdiction 
in the indictment of a Central Intelligence Agency contractor’s alleged assaults occurring at a 
U.S. Army artillery firebase in Afghanistan. See United States v. Passaro, No. 5:04-CR-211-1 
(E.D.N.C. filed June 17, 2004). 
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criminal sanctions against civilian employees and family member 
dependants of active duty service members abroad.92 A soldier who 
committed serious misconduct in Germany, Japan, or South Korea, 
for example, was answerable to both the UCMJ and was potentially 
liable to foreign prosecutors as well. This often depended on the 
category of the committed offense under existing status of forces 
agreements concluded with the host state.93
By contrast, if an active duty civilian family member or civilian 
contractor or employee committed a felony against a U.S. national 
under U.S. law on a military installation overseas, the foreign state 
would have little interest in the outcome and might even lack the 
legal capacity to prosecute. This was not a small problem. At the 
close of the twentieth century, nearly 50,000 civilian employees of 
the Department of Defense were serving overseas, along with 
approximately 200,000 family member dependants of active duty 
service members and civilian employees.94
Military courts were barred from trying civilian family members 
for capital offenses under 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(11) of the UCMJ after 
the Supreme Court ruling in Reid v. Covert.95 As a consequence, the 
 92. For a discussion of the longstanding jurisdictional problems of this type in military 
practice, see Thomas G. Becker, Justice on the Far Side of the World: The Continuing Problem of 
Misconduct by Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 18 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 277 (1995). 
 93. See Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of 
United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea art. XXII 2(a), July 9, 1966, 2 U.S.T. 
1677, 674 U.N.T.S 163. 
 94. Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad—A First Person Account of the Creation of the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 55, 60–61 (2001) (citing 
Department of Defense, Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographical Area, 15–17, 27 
(Sept. 30, 1999)). 
 95. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The provision of the UCMJ struck down on Article III and 
Sixth Amendment grounds in Reid provides for courts-martial jurisdiction over those 
“[s]ubject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be 
a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons serving with, employed by, or 
accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits of the United States.” Id. at 3–4 
(quoting 50 U.S.C. § 552(11)). Virtually identical language remains in today’s UCMJ at 10 
U.S.C. § 802(a)(11) (2000). The Court in Reid actually reached a contrary constitutional 
conclusion during its previous term. See Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956), reh’g granted, 
352 U.S. 901 (1956), rev’d, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Upon rehearing, the Court reversed its 
holding in a plurality opinion with Justice Harlan concurring on the very narrow ground that 
the issue presented involved only the UCMJ’s article 2(11) acting upon service member 
dependants during peacetime in a capital case. Reid, 354 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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only recourse following that decision was for a service commander’s 
staff judge advocate to convince federal prosecutors—thousands of 
miles away and with busy dockets of their own—to pursue a case 
under the special maritime and territorial provisions discussed 
above.96
A similar shortfall in legal process arose for permanently 
discharged ex-service members when misconduct they had 
committed while still in military service was discovered. Because 
UCMJ jurisdiction over soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen 
terminates with a validly obtained and completed certificate of 
discharge,97 the services are powerless to prosecute ex-service 
members unless the member maintains military status by assignment 
to a reserve unit98 or is retired and drawing a pension.99
In United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles,100 the Supreme Court 
invalidated the Air Force court-martial of a former service member 
five months after his honorable discharge for his newly discovered 
role in a murder and conspiring to commit murder while formerly 
serving in Korea. The statutory provision at play in Quarles, since 
repealed, allowed the military retroactive jurisdiction in such 
instances.101 The Court’s rationale relied primarily on the 
consideration that the accused had severed all relationship with the 
service and its institutions at the time charges were brought.102
Justice Black’s opinion cited the congressional testimony of 
Major General Thomas H. Green, the Judge Advocate General of 
the Army, during hearings considering passage of the UCMJ. 
General Green opined that such a retroactive scheme was virtually 
unworkable and recommended “that ‘[i]f you expressly confer 
jurisdiction on the Federal courts to try such cases, you preserve the 
constitutional separation of military and civil courts, you save the 
military from a lot of unmerited grief, and you provide for a clean, 
For contemporaneous analysis of the Court’s decision in Reid, see Note, Criminal Jurisdiction 
over Civilians Accompanying American Armed Forces Overseas, 71 HARV. L. REV. 712 (1958). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 87–91. 
 97. See MANUAL, supra note 14, R.C.M. 202(a)(2). 
 98. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(d)(1) (2000). 
 99. See id. § 802(a)(4). 
 100. 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 
 101. Id. at 14 n.8. 
 102. Id. at 14, 22. 
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constitutional method for disposing of such cases.’”103 It took fifty 
years for Congress to fulfill that advice. 
Effective November 22, 2000, MEJA104 now allows for criminal 
prosecution of anyone “(1) employed by or accompanying the 
Armed Forces outside the United States; or (2) while a member of 
the Armed Forces”105 for commission of any offense that would be 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if such offense 
had been committed within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.106
The Act, § 3261(c), implicitly acknowledges the UCMJ’s 
authority over civilians accompanying a force in the field during 
wartime while at the same time expressly recognizing military court 
jurisdiction to try law of war offenses. That section provides, in 
pertinent part, “Nothing in this chapter may be construed to deprive 
a court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military 
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses 
that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by a court-martial, 
[or] military commission . . . .”107
An amendment to MEJA included in the 2005 National Defense 
Authorization Act108 specifies that the phrase “employed by the 
armed forces outside the United States” in § 3261 of MEJA includes 
contractors and subcontractors of the Department of Defense or any 
 103. Id. at 21 (quoting Hearings before Subcomm. of S. Comm. on Armed Servs. on S. 857 
and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong. 256–57 (1950) (statement of Major General Thomas H. Green, J. 
Advocate General, United States Army)). 
 104. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000). 
 105. Id. § 3261(a). For a more detailed analysis of the MEJA, see Schmitt, supra note 94. 
See also Glenn R. Schmitt, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: The Continuing 
Problem of Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad— 
Problem Solved?, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2000, at 1. 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a). 
 107. Id. § 3261(c) (emphasis added). The Senate version of the bill that became MEJA 
would have expressly incorporated military court jurisdiction over civilians abroad. See 145 
CONG. REC. S8194–95 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (statements by Sen. Gorton and Sen. Leahy). 
For a pre-war on terrorism discussion of the perceived gap in the law regarding defense 
contractor misconduct overseas, see Michael J. Davidson & Robert E. Korroch, Extending 
Military Jurisdiction to American Contractors Overseas, PROCUREMENT L., Summer 2000, at 1. 
 108. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 108-375 (2004). 
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other federal agency providing their employment to support the 
defense mission overseas.109
In March 2005, the Department of Defense General Counsel 
published an instruction implementing the department’s policies and 
procedures under MEJA.110 Despite availability of this statutory 
framework, its recognition of existing concurrent jurisdiction of 
courts-martial to try law of war violations, and the Department of 
Defense’s specific implementing regulation, federal prosecutors have 
yet to employ MEJA for any alleged misconduct of civilian 
contractors arising from their actions during the Iraqi campaign. 
3. The War Crimes Act 
Three years before MEJA was enacted, Congress acted to 
legislate provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 through the 
War Crimes Act (WCA).111 The legislation arose out of concern that 
the Geneva Conventions were not domestically justiciable in the 
absence of executing legislation.112 All four of the pertinent Geneva 
Conventions specifically allow that “[t]he High Contracting Parties 
undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal 
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any 
of the grave breaches of the present Convention.”113
At the time the United States ratified the Geneva Conventions, 
implementing domestic legislation was deemed unnecessary as the 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A)(ii) (2000). For a discussion of the need to amend the Act’s 
original provisions, see Glenn R. Schmitt, Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act (MEJA) of 2000: Rushing To Close an Unforeseen Loophole, ARMY LAW., June 2005, at 41. 
 110. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 5525.11, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
OVER CIVILIANS EMPLOYED BY OR ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE THE 
UNITED STATES, CERTAIN SERVICE MEMBERS, AND FORMER SERVICE MEMBERS (2005). 
 111. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000). 
 112. A self-executing treaty requires no implementing legislation from a signatory to be 
considered part of the nation’s domestic law. A non-self-executing treaty, on the other hand, 
requires executing legislation to be justiciable. For a discussion of the distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties, see BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 13, at 339–
48. 
 113. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]. Although this provision 
of the treaty is suggestive of the non-self-executing view, as it calls for domestic implementing 
legislation, it remains unclear whether the Geneva Conventions are wholly non-self-executing 
in United States practice. See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 794, 797–98 (S.D. 
Fla. 1992). 
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grave breach provisions114 were thought to be adequately covered by 
existing federal law.115 However, when considering passage of the 
WCA,116 Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas submitted that “[a] 
review of current federal and state law indicates that while there are 
many instances in which individuals committing grave breaches of 
the Geneva conventions may already be prosecuted, prosecution 
would be impossible in many situations.”117 He particularly noted 
that killing a prisoner of war was not specifically penalized in federal 
criminal law.118
The WCA allows for a fine, imprisonment for life or any set term 
of years, or death for anyone committing a war crime that results in 
the death of the victim, whether within or without the territory of 
the United States.119 A war crime is any offense “defined as a grave 
breach” by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,120 or in any 
of the “protocol[s] to such conventions” that the U.S. has joined as 
a party.121 The definition of war crimes further includes enumerated 
 114. Grave breaches include “willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.” 
Geneva III, supra note 113, art. 130. 
 115. H.R. REP. NO. 104-698, at 3–5 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166, 
2168–70. 
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3). A final definitional provision of the WCA, not germane 
under the scenario presented in this paper, prohibits conduct 
of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of 
the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 
May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or 
causes serious injury to civilians. 
Id. § 2441(c)(4). 
 117. H.R. REP. NO. 104-698, at 4. 
 118. Id. at 5. 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a). 
 120. Id. § 2441(c)(1). Four such conventions were signed on that date: Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed 
Forces in the Field (Geneva I), 6 U.S.T. 3314, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed 
Forces at Sea (Geneva II), 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva III, supra note 113; and 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva 
IV), 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1). Two protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949 opened for signature on June 8, 1977: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) and Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
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conduct prohibited in the annex to the Hague Convention 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.122 Finally, war 
crimes also encompass any violations of common Article 3 of the 
four August 1949 Geneva Conventions.123
The grave breach threshold thus criminalizes “willful killing, 
torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury . . . compelling a 
prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully 
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial.”124 
Under the Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907, the grave 
breach criteria of the WCA also binds a signatory not “[t]o employ 
poison or poisoned weapons; . . . [t]o kill or wound an enemy who, 
having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defense, 
has surrendered . . . [t]o declare that no quarter will be given . . . 
[and] [t]o employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause 
unnecessary Suffering.”125
Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions of August 1949 
includes identical language applicable during armed conflict 
occurring within the territory of one of the member states but not 
between member states. Known therefore as common Article 3, it is 
designed to provide a minimum standard of care during hostilities, 
even in instances of internal state conflict. As a result, grave breaches 
of the law of war under the WCA include, “murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; [the] taking of hostages; . . . 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977). The 
United States is not a party to either Protocol. 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2). Specifically, war crimes include violations of Articles 23, 
25, 27, and 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3). 
 124. Geneva III, supra note 113, art. 130. 
 125. Hague Convention, supra note 122, annex art. 23. The WCA also includes as grave 
breaches from the Hague Convention annex such conduct as killing or wounding 
“treacherously,” using a flag of truce, a national flag, or uniform improperly, destroying or 
seizing personal property absent military necessity, and abolishing the rights of nationals of a 
belligerent or requiring them to “take part in the operations of war directed against their own 
country.” Id. The grave breaches prohibited by Article 25 of the annex include the attack or 
bombardment of undefended populated areas, id. art. 25, while Article 27 prohibits not taking 
“all necessary steps . . . as far as possible” to spare buildings dedicated to religion, the arts and 
sciences, and hospitals during an attack. Id. art. 27. Article 28 concludes, “The pillage of a 
town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.” Id. art. 28. 
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outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment; [and] the passing of sentences and the carrying 
out of executions without previous judgment.”126 Under the facts of 
our case, the Red River Group contract interrogator has arguably 
committed numerous grave breaches of the law of war. 
While considering enactment of the WCA, the House 
Committee on the Judiciary presciently acknowledged that “courts-
martial would seem to be a powerful mechanism for the punishment 
of war crimes . . . however . . . they apply to very circumscribed 
groups of people: generally, members of the United States armed 
forces, persons serving with or accompanying armed forces in the field, 
and enemy prisoners of war.”127 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) of the 
UCMJ provides that very statutory alternative. 
C. The Case Law 
The paucity of district court prosecutions of contractors 
accompanying our armed forces at war, despite three statutes 
available to the Department of Justice, demonstrates the need for 
appellate courts to reconsider the courts-martial of civilian 
contractors. Currently, the controlling case is United States v. 
Averette,128 decided by the United States Court of Military Appeals 
in April of 1970. 
1. United States v. Averette 
In 1969, Raymond Averette was a U.S. Army civilian contractor 
working at Camp Davies in the Republic of South Vietnam.129 He 
was implicated in a plot to steal 36,000 government-owned batteries 
and was ultimately tried under 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) of the UCMJ 
as a civilian accompanying an armed force in the field in time of 
 126. Geneva III, supra note 113 art. 3 (demonstrative of all Article 3 treaty provisions in 
Geneva I–IV). 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 104-698, at 5 (1996) (emphasis added), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166, 2170. 
 128. 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970). I am not the first to criticize the ruling of Averette. For a 
brief but spirited critique of the Averette majority opinion, which also questions its holding and 
notes the lack of historical foundation for the court’s decision, see Lawrence J. Schwarz, The 
Case for Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilians Under Article 2(a)(10) of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2002, at 31, 34. 
 129. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 364. 
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war.130 He was convicted of conspiracy to commit larceny and 
attempted larceny of government property at a general court-martial 
convened at Long Binh, Vietnam.131 After modification of some of 
the courts-martial findings, he was sentenced to one year of 
confinement and fined $500.132
Upon appeal, the Court of Military Appeals held that “the words 
‘in time of war’ mean, for the purposes of Article 2(10), . . . a war 
formally declared by Congress.”133 The three-page opinion cited no 
binding precedent as authority and offered only a cursory review of 
the extensive U.S. historical practice that actually supports a contrary 
conclusion. 
After briefly touching on several Supreme Court holdings in the 
wake of United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,134 the two-judge 
Averette majority reasoned that, “[a]s a result of the most recent 
guidance in this area from the Supreme Court we believe that a strict 
and literal construction of the phrase ‘in time of war’ should be 
applied.”135 Of course, the war in Vietnam was conducted without a 
formal congressional declaration. The Averette court refused to 
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the military trial court and 
consequently dismissed the charges against the defendant.136
An obvious problem with the court’s stated rationale is that the 
Supreme Court has never ruled on the UCMJ provision at issue in 
Averette. In Reid v. Covert,137 introduced earlier in our case-in-chief, 
the Supreme Court invalidated a different provision of the UCMJ 
that purported to allow military court jurisdiction over civilian 
spouses accompanying their service-member husbands overseas in 
peacetime pursuant to a treaty.138 However, in dicta that squarely 
touches the issue of wartime jurisdiction, the Reid Court wrote: 
 Article 2(10) of the UCMJ . . . provides that in time of war 
persons serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field 
 130. Id. at 363. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 365. 
 134. 350 U.S. 11 (1955). For a discussion of Quarles, see supra text accompanying notes 
100–03. 
 135. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 365. 
 136. Id. at 366. 
 137. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 138. Id. at 22. 
2PETERS.FIN(2).DOC 6/16/2006 3:02:32 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
396 
 
are subject to court-martial and military law. We believe that Art. 
2(10) sets forth the maximum historically recognized extent of 
military jurisdiction over civilians under the concept of “in the field.” 
The Government does not attempt—and quite appropriately so—
to support military jurisdiction over Mrs. Smith or Mrs. Covert 
under Art. 2(10).139
It is just this provision of the UCMJ that should be employed to 
prosecute our hypothetical contract interrogator. Indeed, in 
distinguishing a commander’s authority in time of war over the facts 
presented in Reid, the Court’s opinion noted that “commanders 
necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront. From a 
time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary 
circumstances present in the area of actual fighting have been 
considered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in that 
area by military courts under military rules.”140
The “recent guidance” relied upon by the court in Averette was 
most likely the ruling in O’Callahan v. Parker, a Supreme Court case 
decided one year earlier.141 O’Callahan held unconstitutional the 
courts-martial of an active duty soldier for crimes committed in the 
civilian community that lacked any nexus to his military service.142 
That decision, coupled with a series of Supreme Court opinions143 
addressing other civilian jurisdictional provisions of the UCMJ, 
undoubtedly played a central role in the Court of Military Appeals’ 
thinking. 
However, the Chief Judge of the court dissented in Averette. “In 
my opinion,” wrote Chief Judge Quinn, “there is no compelling or 
cogent reason to construe the phrase ‘time of war’ as used in Article 
2(10) of the Uniform Code differently from the construction we 
have accorded the same phrase in other Articles of the Code.”144 
 139. Id. at 34 n.61 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). 
 140. Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
 141. 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Grisham v. Hagen, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 268 
(1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). Although all of 
these cases addressed courts-martial of civilians overseas, none dealt with Article 2(a)(10) of 
the UCMJ; that is, all were decided concerning crimes committed in peacetime. 
 144. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 366 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting). The dissent refers to the 
court’s earlier holding interpreting offenses as committed “in time of war” in the absence of a 
congressional declaration for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations in a 
conviction for absent from duty without leave. Id. See United States v. Anderson, 17 C.M.A 
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Notwithstanding the lack of a congressional declaration of war, the 
dissent observed that, “[i]n any event, if congressional participation 
is required to energize the phrase in regard to court-martial 
jurisdiction, sufficient congressional participation is present in 
connection with the Vietnam conflict to fulfill the requirement.”145
2. Other decisions that affect courts-martial jurisdiction of civilians 
At least two other court rulings have held Article 2(a)(10) of the 
UCMJ invalid. The D.C. Court of Appeals ordered the release of a 
merchant seaman court-martialed for murdering a fellow shipmate at 
a DaNang, South Vietnam bar while on shore leave from their 
service aboard the S.S. Amtank.146 That opinion, however, relied 
heavily on the service connection analysis required by the holding of 
O’Callahan v. Parker and did not deem appellant’s brief port visit 
sufficient to satisfy the service/nexus requirement. 
Furthermore, the court suggested that hostilities in a time of 
undeclared war were sufficient for purposes of conferring jurisdiction 
upon courts-martial. “[A]ssuming as we do that this is a time of 
undeclared war which permits some invocation of the war power 
under which Article 2(10) was enacted . . . Article 2(10) may not be 
read so expansively as to reach this civilian seaman . . . in port for a 
short period . . . .”147
Finally, ruling in Zamora v. Woodson just over a month after 
Averette was decided, the Court of Military Appeals declined to 
revisit its earlier pronouncement and dismissed fifty-six criminal 
counts against a civilian serving with U.S. forces in Vietnam.148 The 
military system of justice has been content to honor the Averette 
analysis and its limited progeny of cases ever since. 
Although Article 2(a)(10) remains in the UCMJ, the Manual for 
Courts-Martial now cautiously defines in “time of war” as requiring 
a declaration of war by Congress or a similar factual determination 
when the term is included as an aggravating factor for punishing 
certain offenses and for capital charges.149
588 (1968); see also United States v. Bancroft, 3 C.M.A. 3 (1953) (deciding the issue in the 
context of the Korean War). 
 145. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 366 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting). 
 146. Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
 147. Id. at 823. 
 148. Zamora v. Woodson, 19 C.M.A. 403 (1970). 
 149. MANUAL, supra note 14, R.C.M. 103(19). 
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This Article accepts that acknowledging courts-martial 
jurisdiction over civilians in any context would be vehemently 
opposed by some. Arguments against my thesis will be based on 
court decisions like Averette, Reid, and Quarles. Legitimate concern 
that courts-martial of civilians might disrupt the separation of powers 
between the legislative and judicial branch will likely surface, as will 
thoughtful objections grounded in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
In a dark time, when the jurisdiction of military tribunals is decried 
even over unlawful foreign combatants captured in a theater of 
battle—whose stated aim remains the massacre of as many American 
citizens as possible150—any courts-martial option for civilians, 
however limited the category, is likely unthinkable for some. 
When opposing counsels’ objections to courts-martial 
jurisdiction are more carefully examined, however, they clearly open 
the door to well-grounded counterarguments in rebuttal. First, 
Averette was wrongly decided at the time it was rendered. Second, 
the Constitution allows limited courts-martial jurisdiction of civilians 
when they serve with and alongside of military forces in the field in 
wartime. Finally, the policy argument that supports a military court’s 
authority over the ever swelling ranks of for-profit contractors 
operating on the battlefield is compelling. 
 150. It would do well, perhaps, for some to review al Qaeda’s fatwa of February 1998, 
which was published in a London Arabic newspaper and reportedly originated from a group 
named the World Islamic Front. Usama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri “called for the 
murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the ‘individual duty for every Muslim who can 
do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.’” 9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 47; see 
also Scenes of Rejoicing and Words of Strategy from bin Laden and His Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
14, 2001, at B4 (recounting a conversation on intercepted tape how Usama bin Laden was the 
“most optimistic” as to the number of “enemy” killed upon learning of the successful air 
attacks on the World Trade Center towers). Recent revelations by the Bush Administration 
confirm that al Qaeda’s lack of successful attacks on the United States subsequent to the 
September 11th atrocities are not for want of trying. See Peter Baker & Susan B. Glasser, Bush 
Says 10 Plots by Al Qaeda Were Foiled, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2005, at A01. It is now well 
documented that a substantial number of terrorist detainees, once held and subsequently 
released by the United States, have continued active combat operations against coalition forces. 
Thomas Harding, Ex-Guantanamo Prisoners Fight On, LONDON DAILY TEL., Sep. 22, 2005; 
John Mintz, Released Detainees Rejoining the Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2004, at A01. 
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A. United States v. Averette’s Holding Has Little Basis 
in Historical Practice or Supreme Court and 
Congressional Treatment of War Powers 
The conclusion of Averette that civilians are subject to courts-
martial jurisdiction only during periods of congressionally declared 
war has little logical support and virtually no support in national 
historic practice. As already shown in laying the foundation for 
evidence introduced in our case-in-chief, the Articles of War 
authorized courts-martial of sutlers and retainers who accompanied 
American forces during the revolutionary period before there was 
even a Congress from whence a formal declaration of war could 
issue.151
Moreover, for over half a century now, established constitutional 
analysis accepts that the executive branch acts most securely when 
doing so in conjunction with an Article II function and in 
furtherance of existing congressional legislation.152 The conduct of 
war is an executive prerogative and legislation that regulates the 
conduct of forces at war in the form of the UCMJ puts the courts-
martial of our hypothetical civilian contractor squarely within Justice 
Jackson’s first tier of analysis. 
Congress has never issued a declaration of war absent a request 
from the President and has similarly never declined a presidential 
request in any of the five declared wars the United States has 
fought.153 However, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have recently 
 151. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587–88 
(1952). 
 153. Congress declared war on Britain on June 18, 1812. See Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 
102, 2 Stat. 755. President Polk requested that Congress formally declare war on Mexico on 
May 11, 1846. See Letter from President James Polk to the Senate and House of 
Representatives (May 11, 1846), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ 
presiden/messages/polk01.htm (“In further vindication of our rights and defense of our 
territory, I involve the prompt action of Congress to recognize the existence of the war, and to 
place at the disposition of the Executive the means of prosecuting the war with vigor, and thus 
hastening the restoration of peace.”). Congress responded with a declaration of war on May 
13, 1846. Act of May 13, 1846, 9 Stat. 9 (Mexican-American War). President McKinley asked 
Congress to intervene in the war between Spain and Cuban insurgents on April 11, 1898. See 
José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 392 n.4 
(1978). Congress officially declared war on Spain later that month. See Act of Apr. 25, 1898, 
30 Stat. 364 (Spanish-American War).  Congress declared war on Germany and Austria-
Hungary after a request from President Wilson on April 2, 1917. See Joint Resolution of Apr. 
6, 1917, 40 Stat. 1 (Germany); Joint Resolution of Dec. 7, 1917, 40 Stat. 429 (Austria-
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observed that, if anything, it is the specific congressional 
authorization for the executive to use force—not the formal 
declaration of war itself—which has foremost served as the legal basis 
upon which the United States has constitutionally acted in past 
wars.154
Although the United States has seldom declared war in our 
nation’s history,155 armed forces have been deployed abroad nearly 
240 times since 1798.156 During the American Civil War—the 
bloodiest and most costly period of combat in our nation’s history 
and one that also went undeclared by Congress—military 
commissions conducted countless trials of “camp-followers and other 
civilians employed by the government in connection with the army 
in war.”157
Indeed, and more recently, ink on the new UCMJ was still wet—
enacted into law with the full understanding that certain civilians 
serving in the field during war time would be subject to its 
terms158—at the very moment President Truman was committing 
U.S. ground forces to the Korean War. That war was waged 
pursuant only to United Nations Security Council Resolutions159 
and Truman’s Article II authority as commander in chief. Such 
Hungary). Congressional declarations of war to enter World War II were also issued at the 
President’s request. See Joint Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, 55 Stat. 795 (Japan); Joint 
Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, 55 Stat. 796 (Germany); Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, 55 
Stat. 797 (Italy); Joint Resolution of June 5, 1942, 56 Stat. 307 (Bulgaria); Joint Resolution 
of June 5, 1942, 56 Stat. 307 (Hungary); Joint Resolution of June 5, 1942, 56 Stat. 307 
(Rumania). 
 154. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2062 (2005); see also, JOHN YOO, THE POWER 
OF WAR AND PEACE 143–52 (2005). 
 155. These include the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American 
War, and World Wars I and II. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 13, at 168. 
 156. Id. (citing ELLEN C. COLLIER, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES FORCES 
ABROAD, 1798–1993 (1993)). 
 157. WINTHROP, supra note 26, at 838. 
 158. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 159. See S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950); S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. 
S/1511 (June 27, 1950). A reported 33,629 U.S. soldiers were directly killed in combat 
operations during the Korean War and another 103,284 sustained battlefield wounds. CLAY 
BLAIR, THE FORGOTTEN WAR: AMERICA IN KOREA 1950–1953, at ix (1987). For differing 
views on the constitutionality of that war waged in the absence of either a congressional 
declaration or an authorizing joint congressional resolution, see Louis Fisher, The Korean War: 
On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21 (1995), and Robert F. Turner, 
War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart 
Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 949–59 (1994). 
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practice does not logically support the thinking of the two-judge 
majority in Averette that a declared war is required for military court 
jurisdiction over civilians. 
Counsel opposing my argument in the case at bar will likely 
object and cite the celebrated decision of Ex parte Milligan160 for the 
proposition that military courts have no authority to try civilian 
contractors where U.S. territory is not under military control and 
when the federal courts are otherwise open for business. 
But the Milligan decision in no way affects military jurisdiction 
when exercised pursuant to specific congressional legislation. That 
case’s holding is irrelevant to jurisdiction over civilians serving 
actively beside and with armed forces in the field during wartime 
abroad. The majority in Milligan decided only that “in Indiana the 
Federal authority was always unopposed, and its courts always open 
to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances; and no usage of 
war could sanction a military trial there for any offense whatever of a 
citizen in civil life, in no wise connected with military service.”161
The real issues in Milligan were twofold: first, whether the 
military commission that tried Lamdin Milligan should have honored 
his petition for release by writ of habeas corpus presented to the 
military jailers after the Circuit Court of Indiana considered the 
matter and failed to issue a bill of indictment against him; and 
second, whether the act of Congress of March 1863 that ratified 
Lincoln’s earlier suspension of the Great Writ in any way authorized 
Milligan’s extended detention and military trial.162
The majority opinion by Justice Davis observed that the power 
to suspend habeas did not “authorize the arrest of any one, but 
simply denies to one arrested the privilege of this writ in order to 
obtain his liberty.”163 As to the authority to try a civilian, and before 
embarking on the expansive and often-cited portion of that opinion, 
the majority conceded that no one had “pretended”164 that the 
military court that tried Milligan was ordained and established by an 
 160. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 161. Id. at 121–22, reprinted in WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 130 (1998) (emphasis added). At the same time, the Supreme 
Court has upheld the military trial of a U.S. citizen for suspected violations of the law of war. 
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 46 (1942); see also Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429 (1956). 
 162. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 107, 108, 115. 
 163. Id. at 115. 
 164. Id. at 121. 
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act of Congress.165 Chief Justice Chase, agreeing that the Army had 
no jurisdiction to try Milligan under the facts before the Court, 
nonetheless noted that Davis’s opinion swept too broadly in 
suggesting that Congress lacked the power to authorize a military 
trial in any circumstance.166
Although unique so as to constrain broad application to this 
Article’s analysis, it is well to remember that civilian conspirators in 
President Lincoln’s assassination were tried and sentenced by a 
military court.167 One of the convicted conspirators, Dr. Samuel 
Mudd, applied to a Florida district court for habeas relief in July 
1868; the writ was denied.168
The larger point is that it is difficult to understand how 
application of the UCMJ to a very narrow class of civilians, expressly 
allowed by federal legislation during times of war, applied 
consistently in military practice, and recognized by U.S. courts over 
nearly two-hundred years of our national story, suddenly required a 
congressionally “declared” war beginning only with the tumult of 
1970 Vietnam. After all, Article I, Section 8 authorizes Congress to 
regulate the “land and naval forces,”169 not the uniformed, active 
duty U.S. Army land and naval military forces.170
Numerous past advisory opinions of the U.S. Attorney General 
further refute the Averette conclusion as a matter of law. In 1872, 
during the undeclared Indian Wars on the Western Plains, the U.S. 
Attorney General opined to the Secretary of War that “[c]ivilian 
employés [sic] serving with the Army, in the Indian country, during 
offensive or defensive operations against the Indians, are subject to 
military jurisdiction and trial by court-martial under the provisions of 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 136 (Chase, C.J., dissenting); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 161, at 131, 
132 (explaining that, under Chase’s view, “[t]here was no occasion for the Justices . . . to deal 
with the question of what might have been the result . . . if Congress had by law provided for 
the trial of these particular defendants before a military commission”). 
 167. See generally THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE 
CONSPIRATORS (Comp. by Benn Pittman, Recorder to the Commission 1865). 
 168. REHNQUIST, supra note 161, at 167. Concededly, the judge’s reasoning focused 
primarily on the victims of the conspiracy and their relation to the Union’s military leadership 
rather than the prisoner’s lack of contacts with the rebellion’s military forces. 
 169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (emphasis added). 
 170. See Ex parte Jochen, 257 F. 200 (S.D. Tex. 1919). “That it is not necessary that a 
person be in uniform in order to be a part of the land forces, I think clear, not only upon 
considerations of common sense and common judgment, but upon well-considered and 
adjudicated authority.” Id. at 204. 
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the 60th Article of War.”171 Our current case’s evidentiary 
foundation traced the lineage of today’s UCMJ provision back to 
that very provision. 
The rationale supporting Averette’s holding strongly hinted at 
the service connection doctrine articulated in O’Callahan v. 
Parker.172 Importantly, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the 
holding of O’Callahan in its 1987 decision Solorio v. United 
States.173 Arguably, Averette’s ruling reflected a twenty-year erosion 
of military court authority that ended with the holding of Solorio. 
The Court of Military Appeal’s decision in Averette fails to pass 
muster on at least three additional legal bases. First, the Supreme 
Court has never defined war based solely on the existence of a formal 
declaration. At least since the holding of Bas v. Tingy,174 Congress 
has been on notice that the Supreme Court defines public war and 
the constitutional recognition of its actual existence for legal 
purposes in terms expressly other than a formal congressional 
declaration. In The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases),175 the 
Supreme Court recognized that “the technical existence of war” may 
begin with congressional sanction by way of enactments, not formal 
declarations of a state of war.176 Given such clear notice one could 
rationally conclude that if Congress intended only a declared war to 
meet the jurisdictional requirements for prosecuting civilian 
contractors like our interrogator at the Dokan Pit prison, it would 
have so provided. It did not. 
Second, although the Constitution grants Congress the power to 
declare war, the formal act has been anachronistic in international 
law since the founding of the United Nations over sixty years ago. 
 171. 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 22 (1872); see also 16 Op. Att’y Gen. 13 (1878) (advising that 
Quartermaster clerks by position are not subject to courts-martial jurisdiction, but expressly 
differentiating the opinion from the setting of clerks serving with the armies in the field and 
amenable to jurisdiction under the Articles of War); 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 597 (1876) (civil 
engineers laboring in navy yards subject to naval court-martial). 
 172. 395 U.S. 258 (1969); see supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
 173. 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
 174. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (“[F]orce between two nations . . . under authority 
of their respective governments, is not only war, but public war. If it be declared in form, it is 
called solemn, and is of the perfect kind. . . . [H]ostilities may subsist between two nations 
more confined in its nature and extent. . . . [T]his is more properly termed imperfect 
war . . . .”). 
 175. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863); see also Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 
(1901); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). 
 176. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670. 
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Historically, a declaration of war was necessary to put foreign states 
and their nationals on notice of the intent to pursue hostilities. A 
declaration “served the legal function of triggering international law 
governing neutral and belligerent states on issues such as rights to 
seizure, contraband, and blockades, as well as domestic laws related 
to war.”177 Since the establishment of the United Nations, however, 
“war has been abolished as a category of international law. A 
declaration of war serves no purpose under international law; it can 
have no bearing on the underlying legal situation.”178 Thus, in 
modern practice, the practical effect of Averette precludes article 
2(a)(10) of the UCMJ from ever being called into play. Such was 
not the likely intent of Congress; legislatures are not prone to pass 
superfluous statutes in matters so grave. 
Third, even if one accepts Averette’s premise that Congress must 
formally declare war for legitimate courts-martial jurisdiction over 
civilians accompanying the force in time of war, Congress’s joint 
resolution authorizing force in the present Iraqi campaign179 meets 
the requirement of a declaration of war for purposes of jurisdiction. 
This conclusion is manifest when the use of force resolution and the 
1973 War Powers Act180 are examined side by side. 
Section 3(c)(1) of the use-of-force authorization for Iraq reads in 
relevant part, “Consistent with . . . the War Powers Resolution, the 
Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific 
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 
 177. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 13, at 177, 178. 
 178. Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 11, 16 
(2000), quoted in BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 13, at 178. Consider too that 
Alexander Hamilton observed that practice of formal declarations of war among states was 
falling into disuse even prior to adoption of the United States Constitution. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton). Professor Turner presents a compelling argument 
that declarations of war were only required in early international law when a state conducted 
offensive wars. If that is the better view, and defensive wars are fought without need or 
expectation of formal declarations of war by the defending state, then Averrete’s logical 
conclusion as to Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ’s true meaning is troubling itself. See Turner, 
supra note 159, at 906–10 (1994) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)). 
 179. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, 
Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). At least one scholar has suggested that the 
continuing practice of use of force authorizations by Congress should best be understood as 
delegations to the President of the power to declare war itself. See Michael D. Ramsey, 
Presidential Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2003). 
 180. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). The War Powers 
Resolution was enacted three years after the Court of Military Appeals ruled in Averette. 
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War Powers Resolution.”181 Section 5(b) of the Act provides for the 
only exceptions to the executive’s required termination of the 
deployment of U.S. military units within sixty calendar days to those 
instances where “Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a 
specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) 
has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable 
to meet as a result of an armed attack.”182 It is therefore clear that 
Congress placed specific congressional authorization for the use of 
force on the same constitutional plateau as a formal declaration of 
war. This equivalency not only supports courts-martial jurisdiction 
itself but also indicates that, contrary to the holding in Averette, a 
congressional authorization of force results in “a time of war” as 
readily as a formally declared war. 
B. Constitutional Arguments 
To be sure, Article III of the Constitution183 and the Fifth184 and 
Sixth185 Amendments provide powerful support for the view that 
Article III judges should ordinarily conduct civilian criminal trials 
after indictment by a grand jury. Notwithstanding that our nation 
faces anything but ordinary times while uniformed and contract 
forces battle radical Islamists around the globe, the argument claims 
far too much. A plain reading of these provisions indicates that 
limited military courts-martial jurisdiction would pass constitutional 
muster, and that Article I grants to Congress all the power it needs 
to both establish military courts and set the limits of those courts’ 
jurisdiction. 
 181. Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, 
116 Stat. at 1501. 
 182. War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. at 556 (emphasis added). 
 183. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes 
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at 
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.” Id. 
 184. Id. amend. V. “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public 
danger . . . .” Id. 
 185. Id. amend. VI. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed . . . .” Id. 
2PETERS.FIN(2).DOC 6/16/2006 3:02:32 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
406 
 
1. Article III 
Article III expressly provides that trials shall be held in the state 
in which the crimes were committed, “but when not committed 
within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the 
Congress may by law have directed.”186 Congress has directed, 
through appropriate legislation in the form of the UCMJ, that when 
civilians accompanying an armed force in the field during time of war 
commit crimes “not within any state,” they may be tried by courts-
martial wherever they are found. 
Tensions between what the Article III text calls for and specific 
constitutional powers left undefined, though just assuredly reserved 
to Congress, have surfaced before. In Ex parte McCardle,187 
Congress exercised its authority to make exceptions to and regulate 
the appellate jurisdiction of Article III courts, preserved its broader 
efforts in a Reconstruction-era South, and withdrew an entire class of 
habeas corpus reviews from Supreme Court jurisdiction. Congress 
revoked habeas jurisdiction after the case that sparked the separation 
of powers confrontation had been argued to the Court and was 
pending review in conference and an announcement of a decision.188 
Chief Justice Chase conceded that, “this court cannot proceed to 
pronounce judgment in this case, for it has no longer jurisdiction of 
the appeal; and judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining 
ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the 
Constitution and the laws confer.”189
Conversely, Article III establishes the judicial power of the 
United States in both a Supreme Court and such “inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”190 At the 
same time, Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 expressly grants to Congress 
the power to establish tribunals “inferior to the Supreme Court.”191 
It cannot be convincingly argued that Congress has the power to 
establish courts under the powers vested by Article I but lacks the 
authority to define the necessary parameters of jurisdiction those 
courts will exercise through appropriate legislation like the UCMJ. 
 186. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 187. 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
 188. Id. at 508. 
 189. Id. at 515. 
 190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 191. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
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As we have seen, the ruling in Solorio v. United States192 reversed 
whatever trend was developing to hamstring courts-martial powers 
under the UCMJ. The Court observed that Congress’s plenary 
power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 to “make Rules for the 
‘Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces’”193 is 
found in the same section as the power to regulate commerce, coin 
money, and declare war.194 “On its face,” the Court wrote, “there is 
no indication that the grant of power in Clause 14 was any less 
plenary than the grants of other authority to Congress in the same 
section.”195
The writings of Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers 
further this conclusion and express the Founders’ intent to give 
Congress unlimited power over matters of defense, the raising of 
armies, and providing for the means of their support. His argument 
remains meaningful and relevant today: 
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise 
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the 
government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their 
support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it 
is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national 
exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means 
which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that 
endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no 
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to 
which the care of it is committed.196
Of course, the Necessary and Proper Clause197 also serves to 
augment Congress’s enumerated powers when required. In his 
 192. 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
 193. Id. at 441. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton’s views provided much 
of the historical support and constitutional analysis for the majority’s reasoning in Solorio. 
Some commentators have made the subtle observation that, absent thousands of private 
defense contractors filling multiple roles in the Iraqi theater, some requirement of a military 
draft might be necessary to meet the manpower needs of the U.S. force. See Singer, supra note 
1; see also Boot, supra note 60. If that is so, then Hamilton’s prescient warning that 
“circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite” has unique applicability to this 
Article’s core topic. 
 197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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recent book, America’s Constitution: A Biography,198 Yale University 
law professor Akhil Reed Amar carefully discusses Article I powers 
vis-à-vis the other branches of our government.199 Introducing his 
examination of congressional powers and the courts, he argues that 
the “real sweep of section 8’s final clause extended not downward 
over states but sideways against other branches of the federal 
government.”200 Thus, he writes, “[T]he Constitution’s text made 
explicit what otherwise might have been a disputed reading of the 
document’s organizing schema: Congress stood first among 
equals . . . .”201
2. The Fifth Amendment 
Similarly, an exception to the right to a grand jury indictment 
may be found within the four corners of the Fifth Amendment itself: 
“except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of war or public danger.”202 Professor 
Amar has also observed that the Fifth Amendment’s indictment and 
grand jury provisions bespeak a broader recognition of the reality of 
the needs of the military system of justice. While the amendment 
explicitly exempts the military from the requirements of civilian 
indictment, he writes, “the amendment also implicitly recognized 
that military justice more generally could be governed by a distinct 
set of procedures across the board; thus, military trials themselves 
have traditionally operated outside the ordinary Article III rules 
governing judges and juries.”203
Thus, the status of our contract offender returns as the central 
issue, and long historic practice allows for military trials of that 
narrow class of civilians serving with the force in wartime. That both 
land forces and the militia of the period were included within the 
Fifth Amendment evinces the founders’ contemplation of the variety 
of personnel that might participate in military operations in times of 
war and public danger. As we have seen, the common practice from 
our nation’s earliest period allowed for military trials of sutlers and 
 198. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005). 
 199. Id. at 106–13. 
 200. Id. at 110. 
 201. Id. at 110–11. 
 202. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 203. AMAR, supra note 198, at 330. 
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retainers204 to maintain camp discipline. The practical requirements 
and policy that supported these earlier courts-martial were regularly 
accepted by U.S. district courts up through the end of World War II. 
If the assumption of those who object to civilian trial by military 
courts is that there will be inadequate due process protections for the 
accused, the opposite exists in practice. For example, the Article 32 
pretrial investigation, required before a General Courts-Martial may 
try any accused, arguably provides more due process protections than 
the equivalent civilian federal grand jury process.205 Courts-martial 
accused are entitled to representation by counsel present with them 
at pretrial hearings.206 They have the full pretrial right to cross-
examine witnesses, to examine and receive copies of evidence relied 
on by the government, and to invoke their constitutional right to 
remain silent at any time.207 An accused haled to a military pretrial 
investigation may make an unsworn statement to the investigating 
officer on their behalf.208 After trial, if conviction results in any 
charge, a court-martialed defendant has two layers of appellate 
review beyond the existing civilian court system, beginning with 
action by the general officer that convened the court209 and the 
service court of appeals.210
3. The Sixth Amendment 
The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial has long been held 
inapplicable to military criminal trials.211 Though courts-martial 
practice allows some procedural irregularities from civilian trials, too 
much may be made in argument of the right to a “jury.” Military 
trial practice uses panels, not juries, but they serve the same function 
 204. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 205. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3321, 3322, 3331–34 (2000). Targets of grand jury 
proceedings have no right to examine the evidence presented against them, to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses testifying against them, or to have counsel present with them during 
their appearance. 
 206. See 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2000). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. § 860(c)(3)(A). 
 210. As previously mentioned, military service courts of appeals hear appeals from courts-
martial at the trial level below, and, if the issue continues, then to the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, and potentially the Supreme Court. See supra note 20. 
 211. Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8 (1921). 
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as the trier of fact;212 are subject to voir dire,213 peremptory 
removal,214 and unlimited challenge for cause;215 and are instructed 
by a military judge prior to deliberations.216 Although unanimous 
verdicts are not required for a finding of guilt except as to capital 
cases, the Supreme Court has long upheld state court practice that 
allows procedures not requiring a unanimous finding by a twelve 
member jury.217
Once it is established that civilian contractors accompanying the 
force in time of war are amenable to courts-martial jurisdiction, as 
the statute plainly provides, any Sixth Amendment argument falls 
out. Similarly, though much was made of the import of the jury right 
in Reid v. Covert,218 that case controls only capital offenses 
committed by military family members during peacetime and under 
an entirely separate article of the UCMJ.219
Resolution of the real Sixth Amendment issue requires a simple 
understanding that the status in every sense of a contractor actively 
serving with Privatized Military Firms in combat zones overseas 
today is far more characteristic of a “soldier” than of a “civilian.” 
Moreover, our case’s fictional Red River Group contractor is 
currently serving in Iraq. Addressing his crimes in court are an 
immediate concern; he is not a former or ex-participant in the 
machinery of national defense, like the defendant that presented 
constitutional objection in Quarles. 
One additional point underscores the lack of importance of 
Reid’s ruling to civilian contractor misconduct and the courts-
martial option. Some were undoubtedly concerned under the facts in 
Reid that a civilian spouse on trial by a military jury for murdering 
her active duty husband would not be afforded fair process. The 
conflicts of interest for the sitting military jury members should be 
 212. See MANUAL, supra note 14, R.C.M. 502(a)(2). 
 213. Id. R.C.M. 912. 
 214. Id. R.C.M. 912(g). 
 215. Id. R.C.M. 912(f). 
 216. Id. R.C.M. 920. 
 217. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972). 
 218. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 137–40. The peacetime element that limits 
powers of military court jurisdiction over civilians may be dispositive. In occupied Germany 
immediately following World War II, the criminal trial and conviction of a service member’s 
spouse by a military commission appointed by the executive branch was upheld by the 
Supreme Court. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). 
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apparent. This thinking in no way calls into question the trial of a 
civilian contractor for alleged misconduct committed while serving 
day-to-day and alongside of the very active duty military colleagues 
that bring him to trial. 
Indeed, undergraduate cadets at U.S. military service academies, 
although college students, warriors, and leaders in training who are 
not yet commissioned officers or serving on active duty, are 
nonetheless subject to courts-martial convened when necessary.220 
Similarly, civilian members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the Public Health Service, “and other organizations, 
when assigned to and serving with the armed forces” are subject to 
the jurisdiction of courts-martial.221 Members of these last “civilian” 
organizations that augment military units when necessary are eligible 
to serve on courts-martial panels in judgment of their own when 
assigned to and serving with the armed forces.222
Any defense contractor accused of misconduct in the Iraqi 
campaign should carefully consider one final and pragmatic aspect of 
the concept of a jury of one’s peers. For anyone who has served in a 
zone of active combat operations, the surreal quality of life in even 
the most mundane daily tasks can seem overpowering. The question 
inevitably arises as to what a jury of one’s peers means within that 
unique context. 
Though military exigencies may never serve as a defense to war 
crimes, it would undoubtedly prove helpful for any jury hearing a 
case to fully appreciate any mitigating or extenuating circumstances. 
To put the issue differently, were a contractor accused of abusing a 
battlefield detainee in the rough and tumble of a wartime 
environment, who might the contractor truly prefer on his jury: 
courts-martial service members on site who have shared a common 
purpose and mission or twelve civilians thousands of miles away from 
the battle zone, drawn from the safety and comfort of suburban 
America, who cannot possibly understand “ground truth” and may 
not even support the goals of the underlying military campaign? 
 220. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(2) (2000). 
 221. Id. § 802(a)(8). Similarly, these civilian augmentees, along with contractors, may be 
afforded prisoner of war status if they fall into the power of an enemy.  See Geneva III, supra 
note 113, art. 4A(4). 
 222. See MANUAL, supra note 14, R.C.M. 502 and subsequent discussion. 
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It is conceivable that not a single civilian contractor 
accompanying our military forces in Iraq has committed a serious 
crime in theater during the operation’s three-year history. That 
would explain the absence of prosecutions currently underway in our 
federal courts. However, common sense regarding the vast number 
of contractors employed there,223 adumbrates of past practices,224 
and increasing evidence in the form of completed investigations and 
standing public allegations strongly suggest otherwise.225
To return to our case’s events that evening at the Dokan Pit, it 
should be clear that criminal misconduct occurred. Physical assaults 
and willful mistreatment committed upon a subdued captive hors de 
combat,226 failure to provide urgent medical care when the need was 
readily apparent, and the intentional failure to provide sufficient 
shelter from the elements for a suspected enemy combatant are all 
actionable law of war violations and punishable under the several 
provisions of federal law this Article reviews. Both MEJA and the 
WCA227 provide the statutory means for federal prosecution. 
However, to the extent those laws are not being used, or effectively 
cannot be used, they are lesser-included jurisdictional options of the 
foremost and most sensible approach: a military courts-martial. 
It is perhaps the first axiom of law that like cases be treated alike. 
Soldiers and civilians accused of like misconduct in a like wartime 
setting should not answer to different courts, different procedures, 
and different law. The early American Articles of War under General 
George Washington understood this concept in the unique context 
 223. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
 224. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 225. See supra notes 18, 24. 
 226. Hors de combat means “out of combat” due to sickness, wounds, detention, etc. 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1092 (1976). Such persons hold a 
protected status under the law of war and may not be harmed, provided they no longer resist 
or pose a threat. Geneva III, supra note 113, art. 3. 
 227. Of course, the War Crimes Act and the potential for U.S. prosecutions arising out of 
actions occurring in the Afghanistan campaign, along with the torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2340, 2340A (2000), filled a major portion of the analysis provided in a series of controversial 
White House Counsel, Department of Justice, Department of State, and Department of 
Defense memoranda commonly referred to in the press as the “torture memos.” The various 
memoranda are reprinted in DANNER, supra note 24, at 83–204. Released copies of relevant 
portions of those documents are also available at http://www.unponteper.it/liberatelapace/ 
dossier/inchiesta/NYT25sett04COMPLETECOVERAGE.htm. 
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and practice of armed conflict. Civilians accompanying a military 
force were subject to military means of discipline, including trial and 
punishment when necessary. The practice continued for nearly two 
hundred years until 1970, supported in law through declared and 
undeclared U.S. wars alike. Until halted by the ruling in Averette v. 
United States, an erroneous and poorly reasoned judicial decision of 
the Court of Military Appeals, such practice not only maintained a 
consistent standard of behavior among those in and out of uniform, 
but also assisted a commander’s ability to shape and focus the force’s 
mission and helped preserve unit morale and high esprit de corps. 
With the exponentially expanding participation of civilian 
contractors accompanying U.S. armed forces in combat over the past 
decade, in both numbers and designated missions, some things need 
to change. Legal practice needs to catch up with policy if the civilian 
contractors’ role in waging war is to effectively continue with any 
real credibility.228 And the sooner, the better. There is no good 
reason why modern American mercenaries229 should remain 
effectively beyond the law in our national practice. 
 228. Colonel Janis Karpinski (U.S. Army retired), the most senior member of the United 
States Army to be held accountable for the infamous abuses perpetrated at the Abu Ghraib 
prison complex in Iraq, has opined that “when you take those same [interrogation] techniques 
and put them in the hands of irresponsible and non-accountable people, like these civilian 
contractors were, you are combining lethal ingredients. And what happens? You get civilian 
contractors who have a playground, and they get out of control.” Marjorie Cohn, Janis 
Karpinski: Exclusive Interview, truthout, Aug. 3, 2005, http://www.truthout.org/ 
docs_2005/082405Z.shtml. 
 229. The common understanding of the word is used here: “[o]ne that serves merely for 
wages . . . a person paid for his work; esp: a soldier hired into foreign service.” WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1412 (1976). Under Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, a required element in the definition of a mercenary is that the 
participant in an armed conflict “is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention 
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) art. 47, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977). This view precludes a U.S. national 
contractor involved in the Iraqi campaign from one legal definition of a mercenary. It is a 
distinction lost on at least one professional soldier. For policy arguments opposing the perils of 
PMFs participating in war as business for profit, see P.W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc., POLICY 
REVIEW, No. 119-June/July 2003, 5–8; see also Joe Galloway, Broken Army Is In Need of 
Repair, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 13, 2005. Galloway, a veteran war correspondent that 
accompanied 1st Cavalry Division soldiers on operations into the Ia Drang valley in Vietnam in 
1965 that served as the backdrop for the 2001 Hollywood film We Were Soldiers, makes the 
trenchant suggestion that the Defense Department might just as well conclude its civilian 
contractor policies by taking bids from the private sector to fight our nation’s wars altogether 
“for cost plus 20 percent.” “They could hire all the military people put out of work when we 
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Although federal law, including courts-martial statutes, provide 
the criminal jurisdiction necessary to address contractor misconduct 
committed while accompanying U.S. forces in time of war, to date 
that law has not been meaningfully employed. There is little policy 
justification for continuing these separate legal regimes for active 
duty and civilian participants that wage public war on behalf of we 
the people and civilization itself. There is even less historical or legal 
support for doing so.
close down the Army and Marine Corps and Navy and Air Force. We could put in a penalty 
clause if they lose the war.” Id. 
